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LAW AND MORALITY: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE
George P. Fletcher*
The relationship between law and morality has emerged as the central question in the jurisprudential reflection of our time. Those who
call themselves positivists hold with H.L.A. Hart' that calling a statute
or a judicial decision "law" need not carry any implications about the
morality of that statute or decision. 2 Valid laws might be immoral or
unjust. Those who resist this reduction of law to valid enactments
sometimes argue, with Lon Fuller, that moral acceptability is a necessary condition for holding that a statute is law; 3 or, with Ronald
Dworkin, that moral principles supplement valid enactments as compo4
nents of the law.
Whether the positivists or their "moralist" opponents are right
about the nature of law, all seem to agree about the nature of morality.
We have to distinguish, it is commonly said, between conventional and
critical morality. The former consists of propositions supported by social consensus; the latter consists of propositions asserted as objective
truth. Either way, morality, like law, consists of propositions-of norms
that we either violate or obey.
Moral claims incessantly petition for acceptance as enforceable
legal rights. The law moves forward by selectively including and rejecting moral claims about the interests of minorities, women, and fetuses. The great issues of life and death in the law-capital
punishment, abortion, terminating health care-would not lend themselves to a solution without the infusion of moral criteria. The rights of
criminal defendants and of tort victims are addressed at the intersection of positive law and moral principle. Moral claims stand at the temple of the law and demand admission.
This way of thinking about morality can only leave us puzzled
about some claims often made about the relationship between the law
and morality. Conventionally, we regard many moral duties as suitable
for enforcement under the law. But some courts, faithful to a different
way of thinking, balk at assuming that moral duties ought to be legally
binding. In the failure to rescue cases, for example, the courts some* Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593,
599-601 (1958).
2. See D. Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of Law 67 (1984) (arguing that any "sound
legal theory must leave room for moral criticism of law"). For slight variations on the
definition of legal positivism see P. Soper, A Theory of Law 104-08 (1984); Fletcher,

Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 Yale LJ. 970, 975-76 (1981).
3. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L.

Rev. 630, 631-32 (1958).
4. The most influential statement of Dworkin's views remains his early article. See
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 14 (1967).
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times reason that even though there is a moral duty to render aid, it
ought not to be relevant to the criminal law.5 What is this other way of
thinking that treats morality as beyond the ken of the law?
When courts respond to critical claims for moral change, as they
have in desegregation decisions, we occasionally hear the riposte:
"You cannot legislate morality." Innovative lawyers regard this claim
as simply confused. The law has an ongoing impact on "morality," at
least on conventional "morality." Prohibiting racial segregation affects
public attitudes and eventually reshapes conventional sensibilities
about whether it is offensive to sit next to a black at a lunch counter.
The law might even inform perceptions of "absolute" moral truth: insofar as understandings of the "moral" are historically contingent, the
law is one factor that influences people in their assertions of critical
morality. The claim, then, that one cannot legislate morality must reflect a different conception of law, morality, and their relationship.
This other way of thinking about law and morality is to be found in
the corpus of Kant's work. An elaboration of Kantian thought helps us
understand why it is an argument not for, but against a legal duty to say
that the duty is moral. Also, Kant's teachings enable us to fathom the
claim that we cannot legislate morality. While the prevailing view today
treats law and morality as intersecting sets of rules and rights, the Kantian view treats the two as distinct and nonintersecting. The moral does
not petition for inclusion in the legal and the legal cannot determine
the moral. To understand how the Kantian view of law and morality
can be so different from conventional views we have to clarify, in turn,
Kant's conceptions of law and of morality. The final concern of our
inquiry will be the conceptual connection between the two. We will
probe the possibility that indeed law and morality are overlapping, converging or, at least, intersecting sets.
These are serious questions. Legal theorists looking for alternatives to utilitarianism turn vaguely to Kant's categorical imperative for
inspiration. 6 Yet Kant's precise views on law and on the relationship
between law and morality have received much less attention than they
deserve. Of course, Kant cannot have the final word on the way his
thought should be used in twentieth century legal debate, but he
should at least have the first word. My aim in this Article is simply to
examine Kant's writing and implicit thinking on these issues.
The exposition proceeds first by examining Kant's conception of
law, turns to the theory of morality, then to the points of difference
between law and morality and finally to the question whether law and
morality in Kant represent aspects of a single theory of freedom.
5. See People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 212-13, 113 N.W. 1128, 1130-31 (1907)
(The case criticizes the court in Regina v. Instan, 17 Cox Grim. Gas. 602 (1893), for
reasoning that "every legal duty is founded in a moral obligation." Id. at 603.).
6. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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I. KANT's

THEORY OF LAW

Freedom is the central word in Kant's thinking about law and morality. For the purposes of law, the relevant form of freedom is external
freedom, the freedom to act on one's choices. These choices need not
express the dictates of reason. They need not be morally sound
choices. They are subjectively contingent choices, reflecting the divergent purposes of concrete individuals. They are expressed in the transactions that define private legal relationships-acquiring and
transferring property, making contracts and wills, marrying and establishing a household. The function of law is to reconcile these choices in
such a way as to guarantee each individual a maximum sphere of external freedom.
If the function of the legal system is to insure the exercise of external freedom, then the law may be defined as the "set of conditions
under which the choices of each person can be united with the choices
of others under a universal law of freedom. ' 7 These conditions that
guarantee maximum choice are the enacted rules of the legal system.
The choices that are at stake here represent more than needs, wishes or
desires. 8 They are the expressions of freedom in the external worldacquisition of property or gaining control over another's power of
choice in a contractual relationship. 9 These are assertions of freedom
that can conflict with the choices of others. The task of the law is to
insure that the choices of each can be reconciled with the choices of
others.
The negative implication of this definition of law is that private
purposes are irrelevant in legal transactions. The emphasis is on the
form rather than the purpose of the transaction. Two individuals can
concur on the same contract as an expression of their freedom only if
their private purposes in contracting are irrelevant. The aim of private
law is to insure that I may pursue my ends and others, theirs-all within
the framework of rules securing our external liberty to engage in transactions of the same ostensible form.
This notion of law is obviously an ideal. It is not an account of the
law in force in some jurisdiction at some moment of time.10 Signifi7. Translation by the author of 8 I. Kant, Werke in Zwblf B~inden 337 (Suhrkamp
ed. 1956). For a slightly different version, see I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of
Justice *230 (J. Ladd trans. 1965) (Rechtslekhre) [hereinafter Metaphysical Elements of
Justice].
8. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 7, at *213.
9. Significantly, Kant analyzes private law before public law; and within private law,
the argument proceeds from property to family relations. The role of property as the
primary legal relationship awaits an adequate explanation. For the text, see Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 7, at *245-57 (partial translation); I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals *446-63 (L. Beck trans. 1969) [hereinafter
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals].
10. Kant sees little value in the study of the law as a historically contingent phenomenon. See Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 7, at *230 ("Although [the
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candy, Kant uses the word RechtI l or "Right" to capture this ideal dimension of law. In order to make it clear that Kant's theory does not
refer to legal rules and principles actually binding at some moment of
time, I shall henceforth use the archaic term "Right" to capture the
special sense of law as an ideal framework for maximizing external
freedom.
Kant's definition of Right is readily understood if one thinks of it as
the precursor of Rawls' famous first principle ofjustice: "Each person
is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible
with a similar liberty for others." 1 2 The two definitions are remarkably
similar. However, although Rawls relies explicitly on Kant, 13 there are
some important differences between his definition ofjustice and Kant's
conception of Right. Rawls distinguishes sharply between the requirements ofjustice in establishing the framework of social cooperation and
the problems that occur as a result of deviations from this ideal
scheme.' 4 His principles ofjustice tell us nothing about why we should
punish criminals, award damages in tort or compel the performance of
contracts. 1 5 In contrast, Kant's theory of Right not only establishes the
framework of private legal transactions and public law, but it also justifies the use of coercion to secure that framework-in particular against
those who offend against the Right by committing crimes, causing harm
to others, or refusing to perform their contractual commitments.
It is also significant that Rawls' first principle addresses only the
distribution of liberties: he treats the allocation of offices and material
benefits under a distinct principle of universally beneficial inequality. 16
On the issue of material benefits, there is no suitable point of comparison in Kant's thinking. The Right is not a principle for justly allocating
freedom or anything else. It is a principle of harmony among inempirical knowledge of these actual laws] can provide us with helpful clues, a purely
empirical theory of justice and Law (like the wooden head in Phaedrus' fable) is very
beautiful, but, alas, it has no braini" (footnote omitted)).
11. On the distinction between Recht (Right) and Gesetz (enacted law), see Fletcher,
supra note 2, at 980-84.
12. J. Rawls, A Theory ofJustice 60 (1971).
13. Id. at 31, 43, 251-57.
14. Id. at 351-52.
15. One regularly encounters the effort to invoke Rawls as the basis for particular
legal practices. The approach of the original position, however, only leads us astray if
we try to invoke it as the basis for principles of corrective justice or of the vindication of
personal autonomy, as in the principle of self-defense. All legal systems concur, for
example, that a woman may use deadly force to prevent being raped. In the original
position, however, no one would know whether he would turn out to be a male rapist or
a victim. It would not be rational, therefore, to agree in advance to a rule that permitted
one to be killed, should one turn out to be a rapist. On the requirements of the "maximin" solution, requiring that every possible outcome be acceptable, see id. at 152-57.
16. Id. at 60 ("[S]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to
positions and offices open to all.").
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dependent actors realizing the freedom they already have. In brief,
Rawls designs principles of allocation; Kant, principles of ongoing social cooperation.
II. KANT's MORAL THEORY

Freedom is also the central concept in Kant's moral theory. The
freedom in moral action, however, is internal rather than external.
While external freedom arises from the absence of physical restraint,
internal freedom, at least defined negatively, derives from the absence
of sensual interference with the dictates of reason. 17 Though we directly experience external freedom, we do not experience in the same
way the freedom defined as the absence of sensual interference with the
18
dictates of reason.
Kant assumes that we have internal freedom to act exclusively according to reason. It stands as an ideal of human behavior, as friendship and loyalty stand as an ideal in relations between people.' 9
Freedom can be imagined as the consequence of progressively abstracting our actions from the influence of the inclinations and the senses.
Internal freedom is but one of a number of equivalent expressions
for the emanations of practical reason, or pure reason as expressed in
human action. The notions of autonomy, of will, of the noumenal-all
of these expressions represent the same side of the basic dichotomy in
Kant's thinking. The other side of the dichotomy is captured by the
notions of heteronomy, subservience to inclination and the phenomenal. This second set of terms invokes the world as we perceive it with
our senses; the first, a world beyond the senses.
In the first part of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant
seeks to develop the claim that moral action must be an expression of
the noumenal realm. Later I shall attempt to explain why Kant stresses
the connection between morality and the noumenal, but first I shall
trace, in brief, the transition from these assumptions to his famous
principle of moral action, the categorical imperative-the principle that
one should not act on a maxim unless one can will that maxim to be a
universal law.
The centerpiece of Kant's thinking about morality is the notion of
acting out of duty alone. 20 By focusing on his duty, the actor can abstract his conduct from sensual input. This sensual input could come in
the form of internal desires or inclinations that bring one to action or in
17. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 9, at *446-47 (distinguishing between negative and positive freedom).
18. Id. at *448 ("[W]e could not prove freedom to be real in ourselves and in
human nature.").
19. Id. at *408.
20. For the beginning of the discussion of duty, see id. at *391. The use of the
phrase "duty alone" admittedly reads an interpretation into the Kantian text; it stresses
duty as the determining ground of the action.
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the form of an end or purpose that, in turn, generates internal desires
and inclinations toward action. Acting out of duty, 2 ' then, invites concentration of the mainsprings (die Bestimmungsgrinde) of one's action.
Kant concedes that neither the actor nor an observer can ever be sure if
the action proceeds out of duty alone. 2 2 Yet this remains the ideal attainable in moral action.
It is precisely because human beings do not always act out of reason, out of "pure duty," 2 3 that an imperative is necessary as a constraint on the will. An imperative is categorical, rather than
hypothetical, if it does not posit any ends in the phenomenal world.
Only a categorical imperative-also called the moral law-can lead one
to moral action, for any constraint based on ends would invariably inject sensual impulses into our conduct. However sound the content of
the moral law, merely conforming to its demands could not guarantee
that the resulting action would be moral. The criterion of morality is
not conforming to a prescription, but rather thinking oneself into a
form of action that springs from the noumenal world of reason.
How, then, does Kant make the transition from the notion of acting out of duty to the categorical imperative? The way in which the
terms "law" and "moral law" emerge in the Foundations merits our attention, for the ideas seem to come forth, fully formed, without preliminary explanation and grounding. The critical transitional remark in the
first section is Kant's definition of duty as "the necessity of an action
executed from respect for law." 24 This remark provides the bridge
from the discussion of will, reason and duty to the discussion of law.
What does the remark mean? Why should one think of duty as a kind
of necessity?
We ordinarily think of duty as implying a rule to which we may or
may not conform. We violate or fulfill duties as we violate and conform
to rules. This common notion of duty appears in Kant's exposition of
legal duties. For the purposes of moral theory, the central notion is not
duty as such, but acting out of duty. Therefore, the way to read this
curious definition of duty is in the context of the more general claim
that an action has moral worth only if the actor acts exclusively out of
duty. If we substitute the definition of duty in the latter assertion and
make a few grammatical emendations, we get the following:
21. Acting out of duty is distinguished from acting in accordance with duty; the
latter embodies no moral distinction. See id. at *397; (example of store keeper who
conforms to his duty to treat customers honestly, but does so in order to maintain a
positive image).
22. Id. at *406.
23. Id.
24. Id. at *400 ("Pflicht ist die Notwendigkeit einer Handlung aus Achtung ffdrs
Gesetz"). For an excellent commentary on this section of the Foundations, see R. Wolff,
The Autonomy of Reason 65-84 (1973).
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An action has moral worth only if the actor acts out of the
necessity ... [generated] by reverence for the law.
This proposition gains full significance only against the backdrop
of Kant's commitment to determinism. "Everything in nature works according to laws," Kant tells us in the second section of the
Foundations.25 The laws of nature render causal connections necessary
rather than contingent. This basic orientation generates the antinomy
of freedom and determinism that taxes Kant's thinking in the first Critique. 26 The antinomy is resolved only by positing that freedom obtains
in the distinct noumenal realm exempted from the laws of nature. Yet,
given Kant's thinking in the matrix of laws and necessity, it is not surprising that he would hold that events in the noumenal realm must also
occur out of necessity.
The notion of noumenal necessity is not particularly puzzling. We
should recall that to act out of duty is to respond to the dictates of
reason. These dictates are univocal. If one responds to reason, there is
only one thing one can do. This is the necessity generated by acting
out of "pure duty." Later in the Foundations,Kant refers to the will as a
kind of causality. 2 7 This rounds out the argument and brings the notion of will into line with the other concepts tied to the noumenal
realm. As causality in the phenomenal realm expresses the necessity of
one event's following another, causality in the noumenal realm expresses the necessity of a particular action's following- through the
28
mechanism of the will-the dictates of reason.
For the person who seeks to act morally, therefore, the proper concentration of mind is to seek to abstract oneself from the phenomenal
necessity of physical laws and to subject oneself to the noumenal necessity of reason. The argument has advanced to the point that we now
have some guidance on how we abstract our actions from the physical
impulses that subject us to phenomenal necessity. Necessity-both in
the physical world and in human action-means that the events occur
according to laws. Physical causation occurs as a matter of necessity if
it expresses a physical law. An analogous form of necessity in human
action would have to bring to bear the notion of law-like behavior. But
how can this be done? A compulsion in following moral rules would
hardly generate the kind of necessity we need, for, it will be recalled,
the relevant kind of necessity in moral action is one that insulates the
actor from the input of his sense and inclinations. An attachment to an
25. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 9, at *412.

26. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason .*A444/B472-A452/B480 (N. Smith trans.
1929); see also N. Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 492-95 (2d
ed. 1929).
27. This is the opening line of the third and final section of the work. See
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 9, at *445-46.
28. For commentary on Kant's two concepts of causality, see R. Wolff, supra note
24, at 103-17.
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external rule would surely invoke the phenomenal impulses that would
deprive the action of its moral worth.
Kant proposes an ingenious solution to this conundrum. A law can
generate the kind of necessity that, paradoxically, renders an act free
and autonomous only if it is the pure law-like nature (die allgemeine
Gesetzlichkeit) of one's act that provides the mainspring (the "determining ground") of one's action. 29 Any substantive aspect of a law guiding
conduct-other than its pure form as law-would invariably commit
the actor to ends in the phenomenal world. This is the key to Kant's
well-known principle of universalization. Only by universalizing the
maxim of one's action (what one proposes to do) and taking that universalized principle of action as the ground for acting can one abstract
oneself from one's desire and inclinations. This explains what Kant
means by that particular kind of "reverence for the law" that renders
one's actions free from extraneous impulses. It is not reverence for the
content of any particular law, but rather concentration of one's mind on
the law-like nature of one's action that creates the possibility of acting
out of "pure duty."
The first statement of the categorical imperative, then, is this: "I
should never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim
should be a universal law." 3 0 I stress the derivation of this principle
since it is important to grasp it in the context of Kant's concern about
noumenal necessity and acting out of duty alone. It may be that universalizing one's action states a principle of fairness and therefore commends itself to us. Thinking of the categorical imperative by analogy to
the Golden Rule, however, distorts its place and function in Kant's
thinking. Thinking of the rule as one that moral people follow misses
the argument. The point of universalizing one's maxim is not to determine whether an action, however executed, is moral or not. Rather the
imperative prescribes a discipline that enables one to concentrate one's
faculties of mind in order to submit oneself to the noumenal necessity
of reason and thereby confer moral worth on one's actions.
Though there is much more to be said about the structure of
Kant's moral thought, I shall limit myself to a variation on the categorical imperative that converts the discipline of universalization into the
substantive instruction: always treat humanity in yourself and in others
as an end in itself and never merely as a means. Thus the formal principle (act only if you can will your maxim to be a universal law) proves to
be a standard for condemning certain practices, most notably utilitarian
29. See Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 9, at *402.
30. Id. At this stage of the exposition Kant does not refer to this principle of action
as the categorical imperative. The exposition of imperatives as constraints on the will
comes later, see id. at *421, where the principle of universalization is formulated in the
same language as in the first reference but now described as a categorical imperative.
On the five different formulations of the categorical imperative, see H. Paton, The
Categorical Imperative 129-32 (1965).
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judgments requiring that some suffer (that they "be used") for the
good of others. The problem in reading Kant is fathoming how he
makes this transition from a formal principle of universalization to a
substantive injunction about how we should treat each other.
The restatement of the categorical imperative in the language of
ends and means responds to a general problem that vexes Kant: how
can there be human behavior without the setting of ends? Ends seem
to be necessary for action yet they invariably deprive actions of their
moral worth by injecting desire and inclination into action. The categorical imperative is so named precisely because, in contrast to the hypothetical imperative, it seeks to guide action without the setting of an
end.3 ' An end of an action could be compatible with reasoned, moral
action, however, if it presented itself as a requirement of reason to all
rational beings and if, further, it did not trigger sensual inclinations in
32
anyone acting toward that end.

For an end of action to meet these requirements, it must obtain as
an end in itself. If it did not exist as an end in itself, it would presumably operate in the phenomenal world as the kind of end that would
generate desires or inclinations in the actor. The final step in this
phase of the argument is the inference that for something to exist as an
end in itself, it must have absolute worth. If it did not have absolute
worth, it could serve as a means to something even more valuable.
To the implicit question, "What has absolute worth?" Kant responds unequivocally:
Now, I say, man and indeed every rational being exists as an
end in himself. .... 33
If A treats B as an end in himself, it is possible for A to act with an
end, namely B's end, without thereby submitting to the desires or inclinations that would arise from setting an end in the phenomenal world.
Understood in this way, the restatement of the categorical imperative as
an injunction that we treat ourselves and others as ends and not as
means captures in different language the point of acting out of "the
necessity of reverence for the law." The point is always that for actions
to have moral worth, they must derive not from impulses and desires
but from the noumenal necessity of reason.
The assertion of absolute human worth is developed further in the
thesis that only humans have a dignity beyond price in other commodities. 3 4 This premise enables Kant to negotiate some difficult philosophical turns. More significantly, the assertion that human worth is
beyond price helps us to understand the particularly stringent sense
31. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 9, at *414 ("The categorical imperative would be one which presented an action as of itself objectively necessary,
without regard to any other end.").
32. See H. Paton, supra note 30, at 165-70.
33. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 9, at *428.
34. Id. at *434-35.
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that Kant confers on the notion of moral action. As human beings are
an end in themselves because they have absolute worth, they have this
worth beyond price because they are capable of acting out of the necessity dictated by reason. We must be treated as ends in ourselves because, as beings endowed with reason, we are capable of moral action.
Moral action is an ideal. We can never prove that the ideal is realized in any particular act.3 5 Yet so long as we think of ourselves as free
and rational beings, the ideal engages us. It is obvious, however, that
this ideal provides little instruction for resolving conflicts that occur
among human beings as they actually are-invariably affected by sensual inclinations. For resolving these conflicts and assuring social cooperation, we need a different set of normative prescriptions. The task
of resolving these worldly conflicts falls to Kant's theory of Right-his
legal theory.
This review of the moral theory brings us to the point where we
can state more systematically the differences and interactions of the
moral and legal theory.
III.

DISTNCnONS BETWEEN THE MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY

For Kant the difference between the moral and the legal lies in distinct postures of the actor toward his duties. In the moral system, mere
compliance with the external demands of duty-i.e., fulfilling one's
promise-is insufficient to render the action moral. The duty must, in
addition, be the determining ground of the action in compliance. Fulfilling a duty out of fellow feeling or fear brings to bear precisely those
sensual stimuli that deprive an action of its distinctive moral worth. In
the legal sphere, however, all that matters is external compliance.3 6 In
assessing the legality of an action, the motive for compliance is
37
irrelevant.
True, any given legal duty lends itself to execution as a moral act.
If the obligor fulfills his contractual promise because he takes his
duty-and not the fear of sanctions-to be the determining ground of
his action, then he acts morally. There is no impediment to treating
legal duties as the basis of moral action, but Kant does not hold that all
legal duties need be executed in this way. Part of the idea of a legal
duty, it seems, is that one may comply with the external form of the
duty without subjecting oneself to the discipline of moral action.
The critical point is that the external coercion of the law induces
non-moral compliance. Insofar as one acts in order to avoid a legal
35. Id. at *406-07.
36. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 7, at *219.
37. At a second stage of analysis, however, the actor's motive and other criteria of
personal responsibility do become relevant. See id. at *227-28 (analysis of criteria for
imputation and personal responsibility).
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sanction, the action cannot be moral. This is the sense we can give to
the old saw: you cannot legislate morality.
For all the obvious differences between Kant's legal and moral
thought, philosophers seeking inspiration in Kant conflate these two
distinct branches of Kantian theory. Thus John Rawls blends Kant's
notion of rational judgment in moral thought with Kant's notion of a
hypothetical social contract3 8 Charles Fried treats the moral institution of promising as a basis for the legal institution of contract.3 9 Ernest Weinrib relies upon Kant's moral theory in arguing for a legal duty
to rescue. 40 All these instances of interweaving the moral and legal ignore distinctive features of these two realms of normative thought.
A. The One and the Many
Kant's moral theory leads ineluctably to the identity of all persons
acting morally. So far as our actions are necessitated by reason, we all
do the same thing. In our noumenal selves we are all alike. 4 1 Kant's
legal theory derives from the assumption that concrete individuals,
each acting out subjective choices, enter into civil society in order to
secure their rightful claims, as Kant puts it, to "mine and thine." 42 Morality elicits our identity as beings endowed with univocal reason; the
law acknowledges our concrete particularity and seeks to harmonize
our divergent purposes.
Kant's moral theory is communitarian; 43 and the legal theory, individualistic or liberal. The emphasis on duty in moral action elicits our
solidarity as agents committed to a reason that speaks with a single
voice. The emphasis on rights in the legal theory distinguishes us, each
with his own subjective claims, his own property and his own purposes.
We can all have the same duties, but we cannot all have rights in the
same objects. Duties unite us in a moral community of ends; rights
divide in the concrete community of laws.
As is well known, Rawls derives his principles ofjustice by asking
what individuals would choose as principles to govern their lives if they
had to decide in the original position, a perspective abstracted from the
benefits they would derive at the expense of others by adopting particu38. See the discussion of Rawls, supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
39. C. Fried, Contract as Promise 14-17 (1981).
40. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale LJ. 247, 266-67 (1980).
41. Robert Paul Wolff argues that because the noumenal self is abstracted from the
phenomenal world, we "have no consistent account of the way in which several rational
agents encounter one another in the natural world and establish moral relationships to
one another." R. Wolff, supra note 24, at 15.
42. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 7, at *255-56.
43. The possibility of a moral community disappears if we assume either, as Wolff
argues, supra note 41, that noumenal selves cannot confront each other at all, or that, as
Rawls argues at the opposite extreme, there are no distinctions among our reasoning
selves. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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lar principles. 44 Individuals negotiating in the original position come
to adopt Rawls' two principles of justice, the first of which resembles
45
Kant's definition of Right.
Now if we ask the question, "How many people are there in the
original position? One or many?" we are hard put to answer. Rawls
seeks to invoke the contractarian tradition, including Kant's theory of a
hypothetical contract to secure claims of Right.4 6 Therefore he writes
of the original position as though it consisted of distinct individuals
negotiating toward a contract. 4 7 Yet the description of those individuals, what they know behind their veil of ignorance and how they decide
to adopt particular principles, makes it clear that the contracting partners are all mirror images of each other. Thus Rawls casts a vision of a
social contract emerging from numerous identical individuals. The
point of contract, however, is to harmonize the purposes of distinct individuals with divergent values, and therefore the notion loses its bite
so far as the contract links identical, rational and disinterested selves.
The possibility of disinterested, rational choice comes to us from
Kant's moral theory. Yet Rawls relies upon this notion of disinterested
action as the basis for his theory ofjustice as fairness. If the bargaining
procedure is fair, the resulting social contract will be just. By acting
morally behind the veil of ignorance, individuals end up choosing the
principle of Right as a basis for cooperation in a world of divergent
purposes and self-interested action.
B. Are there Moral Rights?
In the contemporary philosophical lexicon, rights are ubiquitous.
We speak of constitutional rights, individual rights, human rights. And
in the conventional view of the matter, there are moral rights as well as
legally recognized rights. The philosophy of rights stands as the bulwark against the communitarian thrust of utilitarian schemes for maximizing the common good. 4 8 Rights stand for the sanctity of the
individual and the private.
Advocates of rights draw heavily on Kant's deontological, nonconsequentialist moral theory. Yet this reliance is misplaced. Kant's liberal legal theory builds, of course, on the Right as well as on individual
rights. But the moral theory, the inspiration for those pitted against
utilitarian ethics, rests on the notion of duty rather than on individual
rights. True, in the legal sphere, rights correlate with duties, precisely
as Hohfeld would have it.4 9 In the moral sphere, however, there are
44. J. Rawls, supra note 12, at 136-42.
45. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
46. J. Rawls, supra note 12, at 11-12.
47. Id. at 136-42 (on the veil of ignorance).
48. See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously xi (1977).
49. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 Yale LJ. 16, 30-32 (1913).
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duties but no corresponding rights.
No particular individual has a right that I act out of duty. Of
course, one might speak loosely of the right of humanity that I act morally. But rights characteristically have a differentiating function. The
holder of the right distinguishes himself from those who do not have
to them. Rights in this sense do not exist in
the performance coming
50
Kant's moral theory.
In support of the claim that rights are foreign to the Kantian moral
system, consider the following example. I take it to be my duty to visit
a sick friend in the hospital. I am told that he is recuperating in Le Sacr6
Dieu, a hospital in Paris. Naturally, I think that he is to be found in the
hospital by that name in the 17th arrondissement, and I journey to France
in order to visit him. As I engage in this act I concentrate as much as I
can on acting out of my duty to visit the sick. When I arrive, my friend
is nowhere to be found. It turns out that my informant meant Paris,
Texas and not Paris, France. By the time I return to the States, he has
recovered. Now the question is: Is it possible that I have acted morally
even though my friend is disappointed? Yes it is. The criterion for
acting morally is not the way in which the intended action comes off,
but my internal posture in the course of acting. So long as I thought he
out of my duty to visit a sick friend, I
was in Paris, France, and I acted
51
might well have acted morally.
Could it be the case that my sick friend in Paris, Texas has a moral
right that I visit him, a moral right that correlated with my moral duty
to visit the sick? I think not. If he had the right, one would have to say
that right was violated when I failed to show up. That would be an
52
implausible construction in view of my arguably having acted morally.
I take it to be part of the concept of a right that if the person who owes
me the correlative duty fulfills his duty, it cannot be the case that my
right is violated. My sick friend might, together with the rest of humanmorally. But this is not a right to claim any
ity, have a right that I act
53
particular performance.
50. Kant does use the term Recht in a few instances in the Foundations. See
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 9, at *442, where he asks whether
promising with an intent not to repay is recht (written as an adjective with a small "r").
When he returns to the same case in id. at *430, he describes the fraudulent promisor as
someone who infringes the die Rechte der Menschn ("the rights of men"). These passages
are hardly sufficient to infer a principle of moral rights. They are compatible with the
view that the obligee has only a legal right to repayment of the debt.
51. The statement is qualified because there is no way of establishing that the act
was not influenced by external stimuli. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
52. Of course, one could argue that my moral behavior serves to generate merely
an excuse, leaving intact the violation of my friend's right to be visited. This distinction-between breaching an obligation and affixing responsibility for the breach-reflects the orientation of Kant's legal rather than his moral thinking. See, e.g., the
discussions of attribution and responsibility in Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra
note 7, at *228, *235-36.
53. One might also say that a moral duty to visit the sick implies a right in the
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That there are legal but no moral rights in the Kantian system
forces us to reflect on the nature of legal as opposed to moral action.
The matrix of interpersonal rights reconciles conflicting assertions of
external freedom. It is because one individual's choices come into conflict with those of his fellow citizens that we need rights to define respective spheres of freedom. In the context of moral action, the
conflict that the individual faces is not with other people, 5 4 but with his
55
own impulses toward action on the basis of inclination and desire.
The theory of moral action resolves this internal conflict by positing a
sphere of internal freedom: the autonomous realm of action based on
reason.
C. Promising and Contracting
Readers struggling with the implications of the categorical imperative understandably latch on to four prominent examples in the
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals.5 6 These examples reveal Kant's
views about the possibility of moral action in four situations. The first
and the third-suicide and developing one's own talents-pose the
problems of moral duties relative to humanity in oneself. The second
and the fourth-fraudulent promising and rendering aid to others in
distress-turn on duties towards others. I shall concentrate here on the
latter two. Because they pertain to duties between persons, they aptly
illustrate the dissonance between Kant's moral and legal thinking.
In the second example, a person in financial distress considers
whether he should borrow money without repaying it. His maxim
would be to engage in the pretence of promising while secretly intending not to repay the loan. Kant argues that this maxim would not
lend itself to universalization, because if everyone engaged in fraudulent promising, their inconsistent behavior would destroy the institution of promising. 57 Therefore, absent a consistent universalization of
his maxim, there would be no way for the actor to take the (non-existent) law-like nature of his maxim as the determining ground of his
action. 5 8
patient that the person subject to the duty make an effort, even the maximum effort
possible under the circumstances, to visit the particular sick patient. A right to an effort,
however, is not the same as a right to a particular performance.
54. On the relationship between morality and confronting other individuals, note
the problems raised supra note 41.
55. Kersting puts the distinction between the moral and the legal succinctly: "Morality is a predicate not of acts, but of the will." W. Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit 45
(1984).
56. The examples are discussed twice. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,
supra note 9, at *421-23 and *429-30.
57. Id. at *422.
58. The alternative account in Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, id. at
*429-30, stresses the fraudulent promisor's using the promisee as means to his own
ends.
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We can extend the force of this analysis to a case in which after the
promise is made, the obligor, caught in unexpected financial difficulty,
contemplates breaching his promise. Universalizing the maxim of
breach would pose the same difficulty that infected promising with an
intention ab initio not to perform. If everyone intentionally breached
his promise, the practice of promising would collapse under the weight
of frustrated expectations. Therefore one could not act morally in
breaching a promise on grounds of financial distress. We can summarize this analysis by saying that there is a moral duty to keep one's
59
promises.
It is tempting to take this moral duty as the foundation of the legal
institution of contracting. After all, what is a contract but two reciprocal promises? Kant attributes this view to Mendelssohn and squarely
rejects it.60 His reasoning is important. In a contractual relationship,
each side acquires control over the choices (Willkzir) of the other. Each
suffers a restraint on his freedom by placing his capacity to act in the
power of the other. Each vests the other with a right to compel his
performance. The acquisition of this power over another person could
not occur by a unilateral act, either by obligor or obligee, any more
than one can acquire property belonging to another by a unilateral act.
A "common will" is required for each to transfer his power of choice to
the other. 6 ' This is the deeper sense of the phrase "meeting of the
minds" once used to characterize the widely misunderstood "will" theory of contracts.
In the analysis of promising, the relevant perspective is the internal
consistency of the promisor's willing; in contracting under law, the focus shifts to the right of the obligee to control the choices of the obligor. The different outcomes under the moral and legal theory
highlight divergent concerns: the former with the promisor's internal
struggle and the latter with the problem of power and control between
two distinct individuals.
D. The Duty to Rescue
Kant's fourth example points to another divergence between the
59. Kant says that everyone would grasp this duty and that the categorical imperative requires the keeping of promises. This passage does not appear in Ladd's translation of the Rechtslehre, but can be found in I. Kant, Philosophy of Law 103 (W. Hastie
trans. 1887) (Rechtslehre) [hereinafter Philosophy of Law].
60. Id.
61. At this point the argument becomes more subtle. Kant insists that the "common will" or the "meeting of the minds" could not be rendered manifest by any of the
common rituals by which parties typically seek to express their mutual consent. Id. at
101-03. The offer and acceptance can never be precisely simultaneous. Therefore Kant
turns to a transcendental deduction of the possibility of acquisition by contract. For
contractual binding to be possible, the will as a "legislative capacity of reason" must
abstract from all the-empirical conditions of contracting and treat the process of offer
and acceptance as simultaneous and expressive of the common will to contract. Id.
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moral and the legal theory.6 2 The question is whether the categorical
imperative requires us to come to the aid of another person in distress.
Kant concedes that if my maxim is that each should be as happy as he
can but I will not contribute to his welfare, this maxim could well become a universal law of nature.6 3 The proposition bears no logical contradiction. Yet Kant maintains that I could not will the practice of hardheartedness to be a law of nature. I would thereby deprive myself of
assistance when I needed it, and somewhat obscurely, reason prohibits
me from willing self-deprivation.64
Kant returns to this example after he formulates the categorical
imperative as the mandate to treat humanity, in oneself and in others,
as an end in itself.6 5 The natural end of all humans is happiness, and
therefore I must recognize this end in others as well as in myself. Recognizing this end in others requires that I render aid to those who need
it. This second cut at the problem strikes me as more convincing than
the mysterious reliance on what rational humans are capable of willing.
The logical laxity of Kant's reasoning in this and the other examples
has been a fit target for criticism. 6 6 Though the inferences are less than
rigorous, I shall accept Kant's conclusions at face value. What should
interest us is why he might come out differently in the analysis of legal
obligation.
Though Kant never squarely addresses a legal duty to render aid to
others, his definition of Right readily yields the conclusion that there
should be no such duty. Failing to render aid is compatible with the
external freedom of the person in distress. There is no violation of his
freedom if he is left to cope with his own difficulties. Further, the claim
that the Right requires rescue runs afoul of other tenets in Kant's exposition of his legal theory. It would impose an obligation on one person
by virtue of the unilateral wants of the other. If promising cannot by
itself subject one to a binding legal duty, it is hard to see how the other
person's desiring or needing one to perform could have that effect.
Also, Kant makes it clear that the law serves to reconcile conflicting
62. Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 9, at *423, *430.
63. Id. at *423. In this passage, Kant relies on a variation of the categorical imperative that adds the notion of the universalized maxim's obtaining as law of nature. On the
implications of this shift in formulation, see H. Paton, supra note 30, at 146-62.
64. In Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, supra note 9, at *421-22, Kant
analyzes the first example of suicide in parallel language. The defect in willing selfdestruction would not be self-contradiction but that because nature prescribes the furtherance of life, a universal law of suicide could not obtain as a law of nature.
65. Id. at *430.
66. See, e.g., R. Wolff, supra note 24, at 162 ("[Kant's] effort [with regard to suicide and developing one's talents] is trebly misguided, for in the first place, his beliefs
are false; in the second place, his arguments are invalid; and worst of all, he misleads us
as to the meaning of the Categorical Imperative."); id. at 171 ("[O]nly the example of
false promising can be shown to be a valid application of the Categorical Imperative.");
H. Paton, supra note 30, at 154 (the analysis of suicide "is the weakest of Kant's
arguments").
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assertions of choice. Needs and desires do not amount to acts of
choice. They are below the threshold of legal relevance.
Kant confirms this way of thinking about aiding others in his argument about the limits of self-defense. 67 If a wrongful aggressor threatens my life, I can protect myself by killing him. 68 If there is to be any
moderation of this right to use force to vindicate my freedom, the crite-'
ria of moderation belong, Kant tells us, to "ethics" (or the moral theory) 6 9 rather than to the law. 70 As a contemporary German theorist

points out, a compelling analogy links moderation of the absolute right
of self-defense and the duty to rescue. 7 1 The person defending the
Right and the potential rescuer may both realize their rightful positions
(either by using necessary force or abstaining from intervention), but
they may be under a moral duty to recognize the humanity of the other
party. This recognition would lead in one case to moderating the use
of force and in the other, to intervening and rendering aid.
This extensive discussion of distinctions between the moral and
the legal in Kant's thinking make a good case for treating the two
spheres as unfolding on distinct normative planes. So far as a duty is
moral, it pertains to the inner struggle of each individual considered
apart from others. This is the account that we might give of the apparent judicial assumption-prominent in the rescue cases-that labelling
a duty moral hardly provides a good judgment for incorporating the
duty in the ambit ofjudicial coercion. 7 2 The case for the separation of
law from morality in the Kantian sense having been made out, we turn
now to several considerations that render the relationship between the
two spheres more complex.
The two examples presented above-contracting and the duty to
rescue-illustrate the problem of securing a moral foundation for an
institution of private law. Other issues arise in considering moral restrictions both for private transactions and for legislative programs.
One could imagine a whole range of contracts that degrade one of the
participants: contracts of prostitution or agreements in which one
party agrees to commit suicide or consents to being killed by the other
(even as an act of euthanasia). Kant does not explicitly address these
problems but he does have this to say about prisoners consenting to
allowing themselves to be used for medical experimentation:
67. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, supra note 7, at *235-36 (the discussion of
necessity).
68. Id.
69. In this passage Kant uses the term Ethik to refer to the sources of constraints on
the legal right of defense. See id. at *235. Numerous terms in the German original can
be translated as either "ethics" or "morals," including: Sitten, Moral, Ethik, Sittliche.
Would that I could offer a better account of the differences among these terms.
70. For an analysis of this two-staged procedure of legal analysis, see Fletcher, The
Right and the Reasonable, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 949, 967-69 (1985).
71. See K. Marxen, Die "Sozialiethischen" Grenzen der Notwehr 39-43 (1979).
72. See supra note 5.
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What should one think of the proposal to let a condemned
criminal remain alive if he has consented to dangerous experiments on his body and if he were lucky enough to survive, and
if the doctors thereby gained fruitful information of benefit to
the common good? A court would dismiss the medical college
that made this proposal with contempt,
73 for justice ceases to be
justice if it is given away for a price.
To put this passage in its most charitable light, 74 we should think

of the medical college's proposing an agreement whereby the criminal
would be spared if he should consent to the dangerous experiments on
his body. The implication of Kant's comments is that courts would refuse to enforce the agreement even though both sides concurred voluntarily and thereby realized their external freedom. It does not matter
whether we consider the agreement from the perspective of the doctors
or from that of the criminal. The doctors seek to use the body of the
prisoner as a means to their socially beneficial end; the prisoner agrees
to let himself be degraded in this way. Both violate the categorical imperative, which in its substantive version requires that we respect the
humanity both in ourselves and in others as an end in itself. While the
doctors seek to exploit the prisoner, the prisoner allows himself to be
exploited.
It is difficult to know whether this example permits us to infer the
general legal principle that exploitative contracts, such as those for
prostitution and exorbitant interest, should be unenforceable. The example of the prisoner is embedded in a general discussion of the imperative to punish everyone equally according to his offense, without
conceding special benefits to some for the sake of furthering the common good. It is the prospect of deviation from the principle of equal
punishment for all that moves Kant to make his extravagant claims
about the imperative of doing justice. Immediately preceding the discussion of the prisoner's desperate bargain, he says: "If justice perishes there is no point to life on earth."'7 5 It is doubtful that he would
engage in the same rhetorical flourish in discussing other contracts that
we regard as hard or degrading bargains.
Significantly, punishment is the only legal institution that Kant
treats as a duty of justice as well as a vindication of the Right. Therefore some comments are in order on the relationship between these
two easily confused concepts.
One way to think about the difference between justice and the
73. Translation by the author of 8 I. Kant, Werke in Zw6lfB~inden 197 (Suhrkamp
ed. 1956). For a slightly different version, see Metaphysical Elements of justice, supra
note 7, at *332.
74. As it reads, the passage suggests that even though the prisoner has, in reliance
on the agreement, undergone the medical experiments and survived, he ought to be
executed.
75. Metaphysical Elements of'Justice, supra note 7, at *332 (translation modified by
author).
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Right is to trace, in this context, the distinction between substance and
form. Corrective and retributive justice have a substantive dimension
that attracts our attention to what the individual deserves for having
engaged in a specific transaction. In contrast, the Right focuses on reconciling, formally, the assertions of independent actors. The question
posed by the theory of justice is: What do the individual's actions tell
us about how we should treat him? The question posed by the demands of the Right is: Is the conduct in question compatible with the
choices of others under a universal law of freedom? The former question is substantive; the latter, a matter of formal harmony.
This distinction is further illuminated by Kant's separation between punishment and self-defense. Punishment, as Kant argues, is a
matter ofjustice; the offender is punished because he deserves it. Selfdefense also inflicts harm on those who aggress against others, but it
would be wrong to treat self-defense as an institution ofjustice. Legitimate acts of self-defense need not be justly related to the punishment
the offender deserves. The death penalty is not inflicted for rape, 7 6 but
that does not preclude our recognizing the right of women to use
deadly force to fend off a threatened, imminent rape. If the rapist does
not deserve death for the completed rape, he surely does not deserve to
die for attempting the rape.
Self-defense has to be understood exclusively as an institution
designed to secure the Right, the framework securing the maximum
freedom of all. The threatened woman may resist a rape, even to the
point of killing the aggressor, because the vindication of her freedom
requires no less. 77 Like securing the performance of contracts, self-

defense accomplishes something: it negates a threat to freedom and
thereby contributes to the freedom of all.
So far as Kant thinks about punishment as an institution ofjustice,
he seems not to care whether it accomplishes anything beyond inflicting harm on those who cause harm. He deploys numerous ingenious arguments to support his view of punishment as an imperative of
justice. 78 Among these is the argument that punishing everyone according to his due is required by the categorical imperative. Perhaps
the multiplicity of arguments testifies to the particular difficulty of artic76. Indeed, the Constitution forbids it. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1976).
77. But compare the discussion, supra text accompanying notes 67-71, of the ethical restraints on legitimate self-defense.
78. In addition to treating punishment as a matter both of Right and of justice,
Kant develops four distinct arguments for fitting the punishment to the crime. Space
permits me only to mention them: (1) equal punishment for the same crime is required
by the categorical imperative, (2) fitting the punishment to the crime is the only precise
legal standard, (3) some punishments, e.g., imprisonment for thieves, are derived by
universalizing the wrongdoer's maxim of action, (4) not punishing murders imposes
"bloodguilt" on those who tolerate the omission. See generally Metaphysical Elements
ofJustice, supra note 7, at *331-37.
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ulating a coherent and persuasive case for a practice that many people
simply accept on faith. 79 It may be, therefore, that Kant's views on the
connection between the categorical imperative and the demands of the
Right and ofjustice have little bearing on other areas of legal thought.
Beyond the areas of punishment, Kant applies the categorical imperative in only one significant area: explaining the required posture of
legislators in enacting laws. He argues that the legislature is bound by
the moral law to realize its well-being as an "autonomous" agency of
government. Yet legislators should not confuse the well-being of the
state with the happiness of its citizens. Rather, the state's well-being
consists in "that condition in which the constitution conforms most
closely to the principles of justice, that is, the condition that reason
through a categorical imperative obligates us to strive after." 8 0
Invoking the categorical imperative as a restraint on legislation
means simply that officials should not be distracted by the pursuit of
worldly concerns, i.e. human welfare, in fashioning the laws. Rather
they should seek exclusively to realize the structure of Right in positive
legislation. Suppose the public as a whole were willing to have the legislature deviate from principles of Right in the interest of achieving a
higher level of welfare in the society. Their consent-like the consent
of the condemned criminal to medical experiments-would not affect
the duties of the legislature. Principles of Right would have little independent force if they could be traded off against increments of welfare. Rawls argues in a similar fashion when he posits a lexical ordering
between the first principle of justice, modeled after the concept of
Right, and the second principle, designed to achieve a just distribution
of material benefits. 8 ' Like Kant, Rawls rules out-at least for a "wellordered society under favorable circumstances -incremental sacrifices
of liberty for the sake of augmenting human welfare.8 2
The institution of punishment and the general practice of legislation are both constrained by the categorical imperative. It does not
follow, however, that both practices raise issues ofjustice and personal
desert. Punishment is an imperative of justice, but not so the legislators' duty to realize the principles of Right in legislation. The latter
seems to follow, in Kant's thinking, simply from the logical primacy of
the Right. 8 3 We can see from this discussion that the notions of Right,
79. See Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 Crim. Just. Ethics 3
(1982).
80. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 7, at *318.
81. J. Rawls, supra note 12, at 60-61.
82. Id. at 243-48.
83. On the logical relationship of the right and the good, the legal and moral, in
Kant, see Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 472, 487-91.
This theme is carried forward inJ. Rawls, supra note 12, at 446-52. Sandel takes the
logical priority of the right over the good as the defining feature of Kant's liberalism.
For his critique of this logical separation, see M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice 1 (1982).
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justice and morality have distinctive though sometimes overlapping domains in Kantian thinking.
The relationships among these three concepts require further reflection. It seems fairly clear that not every moral duty is a legal duty
(e.g., keeping one's promises), and that legal duties can be performed
non-morally (performing a contract for fear of liability). In view of the
general duty to obey the law,8 4 it might be that every legal duty can be
executed as a moral duty, by taking the duty to obey the law as the
determining ground of one's action.8 5 The precise relationship be86
tween justice and either law or morality is not so easily stated.
The respective range of these three concepts must be kept distinct
from their logical interdependence. Is either law or morality logically
prior to the other? Does one provide the foundation for the other?
These are the questions that will now engage us.
IV. THE

UNrIY OF KANT'S MORAL AND LEGAL THOUGHT?

Despite the deep divisions between Kant's moral and legal
thought, one regularly encounters the tendency to treat the Right as an
application and extension of moral concepts. As one German writer
put it recently, "Despite [all the arguments to the contrary], the interpreters of Kant hold steadfastly to the misunderstanding that there is a
84. See Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 7, at *318-23.
85. Id. at *218-19.
86. My inclination is to think that the difference between law (Right) and justice is
best explained as the difference between form and substance. See the discussion of selfdefense and punishment supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. A possible relationship of these concepts to morality is suggested by the following chart:
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This chart suggests, tentatively, that right and justice relate to each other as the
formal and substantive versions of the categorical imperative.
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moral foundation for the Right." 8 7 This is an understandable thrust in
reading Kant, for so far as his philosophy stands as a unified and integrated whole, it represents a more compelling system. If the parts of
the system are connected in some deep way, then those who regard one
aspect as persuasive should be receptive to other, connected emanations of Kant's thinking.
There is little textual support either for the logical independence
or dependence of the moral and legal theory. Indeed it is unclear
which of these branches of Kant's thought should be treated as more
basic. Should we seek to derive the moral from the legal, or the legal
from the moral theory? It is true that Kant wrote the Foundationsof the
Metaphysics of Morals in 1785 before he turned in 1797, at the end of his
productive life, to questions of law. Yet in structuring the Metaphysics of
Morals, he treats legal theory before he elaborates on virtue and practical ethics. Nevertheless, the texts are inconclusive. What we have to do
today is probe Kant's ideas for their logical interdependence. The
problem is whether a connection inheres in the moral and legal theory
that runs deeper than the common subjects of duty and various forms
of freedom. I shall consider three different ways that law and morality
might intersect.
A. Law and Morality as Identical Sets
Law and morality can be brought into tandem either by reducing
legal rights to the range of moral duties or by expanding the notion of
moral autonomy to correspond with the scope of external freedom as
protected by the Right. The first approach generates a philosophical
grounding for fascism; the latter, for modern liberalism.
There were in fact German writers who, during the third Reich,
argued that external freedom, in the Kantian sense, exists only so that
we may fulfill our moral duties. As the philosopher Karl Larenz put it
in 1943: "The individual right to free action ... is not a right to act
arbitrarily, but merely a right to the unfettered fulfillment of the moral
will; it is a right to performance of one's duty."8 8 Other writers criticized "despiritualized democratic states" for not recognizing the "high
spiritual vocation" of the state to compel citizens to perform their
89
moral duty.
If we were externally free only to act in conformity with the moral
law, our range of permissible behavior would be limited to the single
act that reason dictated. There would be no room for private purposes,
no linking of divergent desires and purposes behind the common form
of contract. Indeed, in the fascist utopia of enforced moral law, con87. Gerhardt, Recht und Herrschaft. Zur gesellschaftlichen Funktion des Rechts in
der Philosophie Kants, 12 Rechtstheorie 53, 73 (1981).
88. Reich und Recht in der Deutschen Philosophie 283 (K. Larenz ed. 1943).
89. See B. Bauch, Griindziige der Ethik 218 (1935).
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tract and private consensual arrangements would serve merely to validate the independently binding requirements of reason.
If reducing external to internal freedom restricts our freedom, the
common technique for merging moral and legal theory against the
backdrop of liberal values is to read the notions of autonomy and internal freedom expansively as though they were equivalent to external
freedom. This expansive reading generates a wholly new version of
Kant's moral theory, in which autonomy and freedom are taken in their
contemporary sense to mean the freedom to set one's own ends, in
one's own interest, as a self-legislating agent. Under this reading of
Kant, respecting the humanity of others comes to mean respecting
others as analogously situated, self-interested actors. Perhaps this is a
way of adapting Kant to a culture skeptical about reason as a guide to
moral action. 90 Yet it is not faithful to original text. It merges the
moral and the legal in Kant, but only at the price of distorting his moral
theory.
B. Intersecting Sets: Morality as Side Constraint
A less ambitious intrusion of moral theory in legal transactions
would be to treat as void all consensual arrangements that violated the
imperative to treat others never merely as means, but always as ends in
themselves. Thus we would have an account of the common legal rejection of unconscionable contracts and other arrangements that violate public order and bones mores. Where the moral set intersects with
the legal, the moral prevails. 9 ' Although this restriction on freedom of
contract makes good sense on grounds of interpersonal morality and
social justice, I have doubts whether it is compatible with Kant's radically liberal theory of contracts.
Kant thinks of contract by analogy to the acquisition of property.
As control over chattels is an expression of Willkzir, so is the control
over another person's freedom embodied in a contractual relationship. 9 2 If the basic premise of the law of property is that all objects
must be subject, in principle, to ownership, 9 3 it should be the basic
premise of contract law that every possible bargain should be available
to those willing to agree to its terms. As removing chattels from the
range of possible ownership restricts freedom, so does the removal of a
potential bargain restrict the freedom of the parties to regulate their
lives.
This is a rigorous position, an extreme position in defense of the
pure theory of Right. In response to this logic of universal freedom,
90. See the debate between Finnis and Richards in this issue.
91. To carry out the metaphor of intersecting sets, it seems that some cases of
moral duty, e.g., social promises, would fall outside the set of legal transactions.
92. Ladd omitted the material on contracts from his translation of the Rechtslehre.
Therefore, see Philosophy of Law, supra note 59, at 100-01.
93. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 7, at *246-47.
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contemporary European legal systems have developed a technique for
integrating moral restraint into the system of Right. As illustrated by
the doctrine of abuse of right, the technique consists in reasoning in
two lexically ordered stages. At the first stage, the right is affirmed in
its pure and absolute form; at the second stage, moral and humanitarian considerations enter into the analysis as a restraint on the scope of
94
the Right.
Kant himself considers possible moral constraints on the right of
self-defense. 9 5 The absolute right to defend one's external freedom
defines the first level of argument; moral restrictions enter as a constraint. The difficult next step for Kant would be to authorize the
courts to enforce these moral restraints even if they enter in at a subsid96
iary stage of analysis.
C. Morality as a Subset: The Right as a Frameworkfor Moral Action
A long tradition of argument supports the view that the framework
of the Right exists in order to permit the possibility of moral action. In
1795, two years before Kant published his views in the Metaphysics of
Morals, Paul Johann Feuerbach took this position in a still influential
essay. 9 7 After considering and rejecting a number of possible connections between Right and morality, Feuerbach concludes that the Right
is a "species of freedom sanctioned by reason that serves as a condition
for achieving the 'highest purpose' [namely, moral action]." 98 As
though in an unbroken line of influence, Radbruch argues in the contemporary literature: "The Right confers subjective rights on individuals so that they can better fulfill their moral duties." 9 9
The view that emerges from the Feuerbach-Radbruch thesis is that
the Right creates a field for moral choice. It must be up to the individual who is in the position to exploit others to choose not to do so; it
must be up to the person entitled to exercise his right of defense to
attend to the humanity and the interests of the aggressor.
This view differs significantly from the first claim that collapses law
and morality by treating the former merely as a coercive institutionalization of the latter. The appeal of the Feuerbrach-Radbruch thesis is
that it preserves the notion of morality as self-legislated rather than externally compelled action. That moral action must be free in this sense
94. I have discussed this procedure in greater detail in Fletcher, supra note 70.
95. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
96. German courts have done this in the field of self-defense and in other applications of the theory of "abuse of rights." See Fletcher, supra note 70, at 952.
97. Feuerbach, Versuch fiber den Begriff des Rechts, 6 Miethammers
PhilosophischesJournal 138 (1795), reprinted in Begriff und Wesen des Rechts I (W.
Maihofer ed. 1973).
98. Id. at 16.
99. G.Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie 140 (6th ed. 1963).
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is indispensable to any theory of the relationship of law and morality
faithful to the Kantian texts.
The hypothesis that law, the framework of Right, serves only the
purpose of facilitating moral action poses problems of another sort.
Suppose that some increment of freedom did not serve this instrumental goal. Would that mean that freedom had no value in itself?. Kant
certainly seems to write about external freedom as though freedom required no justification. But if freedom is important only so far as it
serves the "highest purpose" of moral action, it would rest on unsure
intellectual foundations.
The yearning for a union between Kant's moral and legal thinking
remains unsatisfied. If the two sets collapse into one, the result is
either a fascist distortion of law or a liberal distortion of Kantian morality. If morality is a side constraint, an intersecting set, then the state
must engage in the task of enforcing moral precepts and thereby undermine the possibility of self-legislated moral action. If freedom and the
Right exist merely to facilitate a subset of moral acts, then freedom can
no longer claim to be an intrinsic value.
CONCLUSION

Probing the relationship between law and morality requires that we
assess at least three distinct questions. The question might be how law
and morality relate to each other as a conceptual matter. This inquiry
leads us to stress the internal nature of morality and the external nature
of law.
Alternatively, despite protestations that Kantian morality is merely
a theory about acting out of noumenal necessity, we might take this
morality to stand for specific duties, such as the duties not to commit
suicide, not to lie, to keep one's promises, to rescue others in distress,
and in general never to abuse the humanity of others by treating them
merely as means to one's own ends. If this is what morality means in
the Kantian sense, then we confront a serious question about the extent
to which we should integrate those substantive values into the law.
Third, we might take the issue of law and morality to be the logical
primacy of either law or morality and the possibility of deriving one
from the other. We have canvassed possible solutions to his conundrum and have found none free from philosophical difficulty.
The integration of moral precepts into law is the version of the
problem that taxes us as committed participants in the legal system.
We strive for a legal system that gives maximum scope to individual
freedom but that at the same time integrates communitarian and humanitarian concerns into the law. We favor party autonomy in contracts, but fear a return to the excesses of Lochner.10 0 As liberals, we are
chary of duties to rescue, but the hypothetical of the passer-by ignoring
100. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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the drowning baby suffices to make the case for communitarian duties
to aid others in distress. An absolute right of self-defense, even as
against a fleeing, petty thief, follows from the concept of Right, 10 1 but
one is hard pressed to find supporters for this degree of rightful hardheartedness. What are we to do in the face of this endless conflict in
our legal theory between the demands of a liberal theory of Right and
the communitarian thrust of Kant's morality?
Though Kant does not solve the problem for us, he frames the
conflict by articulating two different bodies of thought-the communitarian and the liberal, the moral and the legal. The communitarian values of the moral theory can enter as a corrective to the rigors of the
Right, yet there are deep problems that await us in working out that
resolution. How far should moral values enter in the second stage of
analysis? It is not clear whether there is some systematic way of approaching the problem or whether we must proceedfaute de mieux, by
selective, intuitive inclusion of moral restrictions on the Right.
At the end of this inquiry, we are, alas, but beginning.
101. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 7, at *235-36 (moderation belongs not to Right but only to Ethics). For a discussion of this issue in German law, see
G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 870-74 (1978).

